An interesting PBS Frontline documentary on how the business models of the
major airlines are throwing away safety by subcontracting flights to regionals
(without telling passengers, and without reducing ticket prices).

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/flyingcheap/view/

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> An interesting PBS Frontline documentary on how the business models of the
> major airlines are throwing away safety by subcontracting flights to
> regionals
> (without telling passengers, and without reducing ticket prices).

Why should this require them to reduce ticket prices?

tim.... writes:

> Why should this require them to reduce ticket prices?

Because passengers pay in part for safety, and safety is greatly reduced when
a regional airline operates the flight. Passengers pay for their tickets in
the expectation that they will enjoy the superlative safety record of a major
airline, when in fact they will be subjected to an order of magnitude greater
risk with a regional.

"Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
...
> tim.... writes:
>
>> Why should this require them to reduce ticket prices?
>
> Because passengers pay in part for safety,

Do they?

Do they really?

Do passengers really pay more to fly with Qantas (who have never lost an
airliner) than with e.g United, who have?

Does the safety record really make a difference? I know that people don't
like to fly with airlines from developing countries, who just happen to have
poor safety records, but that is as much because of the service on offer.
Is the safety record of different (in this case US) airlines so different?

tim

On Feb 13, 8:55*pm, "tim...." > wrote:
> "Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
>
> ...
>
> > tim.... writes:
>
> >> Why should this require them to reduce ticket prices?
>
> > Because passengers pay in part for safety,
>
> Do they?
>
> Do they really?
>
> Do passengers really pay more to fly with Qantas (who have never lost an
> airliner) than with e.g United, who have?
>
> Does the safety record really make a difference? *I know that people don't
> like to fly with airlines from developing countries, who just happen to have
> poor safety records, but that is as much because of the service on offer.
> Is the safety record of different (in this case US) airlines so different?
>
> tim

if they have poor safety records they generally get banned....

"tim...." > wrote in message
...
>
> "Mxsmanic" > wrote in message
> ...
>> tim.... writes:
>>
>>> Why should this require them to reduce ticket prices?
>>
>> Because passengers pay in part for safety,
>
> Do they?
>
> Do they really?
>
> Do passengers really pay more to fly with Qantas (who have never lost an
> airliner) than with e.g United, who have?
>
> Does the safety record really make a difference? I know that people don't
> like to fly with airlines from developing countries, who just happen to
> have poor safety records, but that is as much because of the service on
> offer. Is the safety record of different (in this case US) airlines so
> different?

Even vaunted Qantas has had its rough patches:

"Qantas loses public trust on safety record
* Steve Creedy, Aviation writer
* From: The Australian
* December 08, 2008 12:00AM

QANTAS is heading into negotiations with British Airways amid new evidence
that public faith in the airline's safety record has taken a hit and that
some Australians no longer view the airline as safe.

Two serious in-flight safety scares at the airline, increased media
attention on lesser incidents and a spate of delays and cancellations appear
to have left passengers worried that the airline's safety standards have
dropped.

A survey by Labor pollsters UMR Research shows two- thirds of Australians
still believe Qantas is a safe airline to fly, but 63 per cent say safety
standards have become worse over the past few years. The online survey of
1000 people conducted between August and late November shows women, younger
Australians and Victorians are more worried about Qantas safety.

Nine out of 10 Australians believe Qantas maintenance should be done in
Australia, rather than overseas. The survey also raises a worrying note for
the airline's new maintenance joint venture with Malaysia Airlines in Kuala
Lumpur, with almost three-quarters of respondents believing the quality of
work done in Malaysia is lower than in Australia.

Related Coverage

* Reader's Comments: Qantas appeals for Australians' support
NEWS.com.au,
* Readers' Comments: Faith lost in Qantas - poll - PerthNow Perth Now,
* Public losing faith in Qantas, poll NEWS.com.au, 8 Dec 2008
* Qantas just unlucky, say mechanics NEWS.com.au, 23 Oct 2008
* Qantas workers considering strike The Australian, 10 Oct 2008

The survey comes as Transport Minister Anthony Albanese yesterday called for
Qantas to remain an Australian-owned airline for security reasons. "There
are national security issues, particularly for an island continent located
on the globe where Australia is, for having a national airline," he said.

The recent unrest in Thailand, which saw the Bangkok international airport
shut down for a week, was a case in point, he said."When Australians were
having difficulty departing from Thailand, I was able to pick up the phone
to the chief executive of Qantas, Alan Joyce, and make the request that
extra flights be put on."

The UMR survey found 73 per cent of men believed Qantas was a safe airline
compared with just 63 per cent of women.And 16 per cent of women and 17 per
cent of people under 30 viewed the airline as unsafe.

Sixteen per cent of people in Victoria, which was the centre of a
maintenance union wage campaign which included claims of safety problems
with offshore maintenance earlier this year, thought Qantas unsafe but this
dropped to 7 per cent for people over 70. High-income earners were less
worried about Qantas safety, with 74 per cent of people earning more than
$80,000 a year considering it safe and just 10 per cent saying it wasn't.

The poll was taken in three tranches, with the first done in the month after
an exploding oxygen cylinder blew a hole in the side of a Qantas jumbo jet
and prompted an emergency descent near Manila and the others conducted in
September and November. The airline suffered a second accident in early
October when an Airbus A330 twice pitched nose-down off the coast of Western
Australia, seriously injuring 14 people. Investigations into both incidents
are continuing but have initially centred on possible manufacturing problems
beyond the airline's control.

Qantas has also vigorously defended its safety record and says the number of
aircraft forced to turn back because of maintenance problems had not risen
despite the media coverage. It said the Qantas Group's rate of 98 turnbacks
for 350,000 flights (including Jetstar) compared favourably with other
airlines.

Chairman Leigh Clifford told the recent annual meeting that safety remained
the airline's No1 priority."

It's also worth noting that Qantas's new Jetstar operation makes much noise
that it charges lower fares.

tim.... writes:

> Do they?
>
> Do they really?
>
> Do passengers really pay more to fly with Qantas (who have never lost an
> airliner) than with e.g United, who have?

Qantas is not demonstrably safer than United. Regional airlines are
demonstrably worse than the majors.

> Does the safety record really make a difference?

For a substantial minority of passengers (a 30-50%, I'd guess), it does make a
difference, if they are made aware of the safety record. Many people have had
it drilled into them that airline travel is completely, totally safe, however,
and probably don't ask themselves any questions today. The problem is that,
while air travel is very safe, it isn't completely safe, and the differences
in safety between a major airline and a regional are real and significant.

> I know that people don't
> like to fly with airlines from developing countries, who just happen to have
> poor safety records, but that is as much because of the service on offer.

Many people don't realize how poor the record is in the Third World, again
because they are constantly told that all airlines are safe.

> Is the safety record of different (in this case US) airlines so different?

Airlines and the airline industry deliberately avoid all discussion of safety,
and won't even talk about relative safety. They tell everyone that it's always
110% safe everywhere, with no difference between carriers. But there are
differences.

Sancho Panza writes:

> if they have poor safety records they generally get banned....

The European Union has certainly banned some airlines, but are airlines banned
in the U.S.? I haven't been able to find a list for the U.S., whereas it's
easy to find for Europe. Europe has banned just about every African airline,
and quite a few Asian airlines. It never bans its own airlines, though, as
far as I know (no matter how bad the record of Turkish Airlines might be, if
you truly consider Turkey part of Europe).

In article >,
Mxsmanic > wrote:

> > Does the safety record really make a difference?
>
> For a substantial minority of passengers (a 30-50%, I'd guess), it does make
> a
> difference, if they are made aware of the safety record. Many people have had
> it drilled into them that airline travel is completely, totally safe,
> however,
> and probably don't ask themselves any questions today. The problem is that,
> while air travel is very safe, it isn't completely safe, and the differences
> in safety between a major airline and a regional are real and significant.

So, if they care, they would find out who is running the flight and
stay away. Most of the websites I have looked around on tell you at
least the aircraft and mostly the carrier if it is other than the
airline itself. If anyone is interested all they really have to do is
stay on equipment from Boeing or Airbus and they should be with the
"real" airlines.


>
> Airlines and the airline industry deliberately avoid all discussion of
> safety,
> and won't even talk about relative safety. They tell everyone that it's
> always
> 110% safe everywhere, with no difference between carriers. But there are
> differences.
That Dateline, USA Today, the NYT, the AP and a multitude of other
sources point out from time to time.

--
I get off on '57 Chevys
I get off on screamin' guitars
--Eric Clapton

On Feb 13, 8:19*am, Mxsmanic > wrote:
> An interesting PBS Frontline documentary on how the business models of the
> major airlines are throwing away safety ...
>

I don't think I'd go that far, but I would agree that the beancounters
at the major airlines seem to have found a way to "cash in" some of
their exemplary safety record for a little more profit by
subcontracting some of their flights to the (cheaper) regional
airlines. Especially since, according to the documentary, they are
not liable when things go wrong with their subcontractors. (Is this
true?). It looks like they get away with it because their customers
aren't aware that the subcontractor is a totally independent entity,
and that it might not have the same attention to safety that the major
carrier does.

The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
response to the stall. Has there been any other analysis (made
public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
stall?

Kurt Ullman writes:

> So, if they care, they would find out who is running the flight and
> stay away.

If they knew that there are substantial safety differences--but they don't.

> Most of the websites I have looked around on tell you at
> least the aircraft and mostly the carrier if it is other than the
> airline itself. If anyone is interested all they really have to do is
> stay on equipment from Boeing or Airbus and they should be with the
> "real" airlines.

They don't try to look it up because they don't realize that there's a
difference worth checking into.

I agree that staying with Boeing or Airbus aircraft is usually pretty safe.

And yes, I have canceled flights myself after discovering that they would be
flown on regional turboprops, although it wasn't just or primarily because of
doubts about pilot competence.

> That Dateline, USA Today, the NYT, the AP and a multitude of other
> sources point out from time to time.

They talk about accidents, but not safety.

An accident is the result of an accumulation of many individual errors. Often
these errors were made for a very long time individually until they finally
combined in an unhappy way. The documentary even points this out.

Because of this, you can have two carriers that are vastly different in their
safety levels without any difference in accidents (until the above happens).
One might have very generous safety margins (and will thus avoid accidents),
while the other might have very thin margins (and will thus have an accident
sooner or later). You don't really know until the accidents occur; the best
you can do is infer from what you do know. Deep discounts on tickets are one
sign that there may be shortcuts taken on safety.

FlyCherokee writes:

> The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
> half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
> very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
> response to the stall. Has there been any other analysis (made
> public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
> stall?

During the last hearing held by the NTSB, that agency made it clear that pilot
incompetence and lack of experience were the probable causes of the accident.
The pilots made multiple serious mistakes that accumulated until a crash
occurred. They failed to maintain a sterile cockpit, they reacted improperly
to the problems they experienced again and again, etc. A competent flight deck
crew would have easily avoided the crash, and could have dealt with the
problems successfully even if they were somehow allowed to occur.

Overall the NTSB was very hard on the pilots. The aircraft was fine, and
weather does not appear to have been a factor.

If you watch the NTSB animation you can see many mistakes being made, even if
you're not familiar with the specific aircraft in question.

In article >,
Mxsmanic > wrote:

> Kurt Ullman writes:
>
> > So, if they care, they would find out who is running the flight and
> > stay away.
>
> If they knew that there are substantial safety differences--but they don't.

If they cared they would know and find out.

> They don't try to look it up because they don't realize that there's a
> difference worth checking into.
>
Then they aren't really interested and certainly not paying
attention.

> > That Dateline, USA Today, the NYT, the AP and a multitude of other
> > sources point out from time to time.
>
> They talk about accidents, but not safety.

The last Dateline (or maybe the one on CBS, I get them confused)
talked about lousy safety records, poor pilot training and requirements,
long commutes, etc. Same with the last CNN chat about regional airlines
and the last AP article I saw. Much umbrage and angst from the Fourth
Estate recently.

--
I get off on '57 Chevys
I get off on screamin' guitars
--Eric Clapton

On Feb 13, 9:33*pm, Kurt Ullman > wrote:
> In article >,
>
> *Mxsmanic > wrote:
> > Kurt Ullman writes:
>
> > > So, if they care, they would find out who is running the flight and
> > > stay away.
>
> > If they knew that there are substantial safety differences--but they don't.
>
> * If they cared they would know and find out.
>
> > They don't try to look it up because they don't realize that there's a
> > difference worth checking into.
>
> * * Then they aren't really interested and certainly not paying
> attention.
>
> > > That Dateline, USA Today, the NYT, the AP and a multitude of other
> > > sources point out from time to time.
>
> > They talk about accidents, but not safety.
>
> * *The last Dateline (or maybe the one on CBS, I get them confused)
> talked about lousy safety records, poor pilot training and requirements,
> long commutes, etc. Same with the last CNN chat about regional airlines
> and the last AP article I saw. Much umbrage and angst from the Fourth
> Estate recently.
>
> --
> I get off on '57 Chevys
> I get off on screamin' guitars
> * * * --Eric Clapton

Recently (1-- 3 years ago) a passenger airliner crashed allegedly from
later determined PILOTS ERRORS near Buffalo:

The pilot's file shows he was apparently unqualified if not
inexperienced

The co-pilot's file apparently ditto

Plus they both were reportedly fatigued

The co-pilot pay for the commuter gigs is something like $26 thousand
a year

I do not fly unless my dear wife pushes, and the above is certainly
plenty of reasons enough

A few months ago we flew in a small passenger commuter plane RT
Atlanta-Gulfport Miss
and do acknowledge the trips went smoothly, except those
Jackson-Hartsfield end of concourse concrete steps, no other
complaint

I am slightly surprised the Buffalo commuter airline has an insurance
underwriter, because I would
expect them to rationally beg off of doing business with such an
alleged certified airline

On Feb 13, 8:23*am, Mxsmanic > wrote:
> tim.... writes:
> > Why should this require them to reduce ticket prices?
>
> Because passengers pay in part for safety, and safety is greatly reduced when
> a regional airline operates the flight. *Passengers pay for their tickets in
> the expectation that they will enjoy the superlative safety record of a major
> airline, when in fact they will be subjected to an order of magnitude greater
> risk with a regional.

I think this has been proven false over and over. Even the most
"dangerous" airlines in the US are enormously safe. There is nothing
to suggest that travelers pay any extra for the airlines with a better
record. Top priorities for travelers are...
1) Price
2) Price
3) Price
4) On time
5) Personal experience (have they ****ed me off in the past)?
6) Goodies (frequent flyer miles, etc)
7) Connections

These priorities have been proven over and over.

-Robert

On Feb 13, 3:43*pm, FlyCherokee > wrote:
> On Feb 13, 8:19*am, Mxsmanic > wrote:

> The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
> half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
> very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
> response to the stall. *Has there been any other analysis (made
> public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
> stall?

As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
stall scenario.

-Robert

"Robert M. Gary" > wrote:

> FlyCherokee > wrote:
>
>> The accident itself is still a mystery to me. I only saw the first
>> half of the show, but that part made it look like the crew made some
>> very fundamental errors; not maintaining airspeed, and a very strange
>> response to the stall. *Has there been any other analysis (made
>> public) that explains the captain pulling back on the stick during the
>> stall?
>
> As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
> reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
> same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
> for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
> forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
> stall scenario.

In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that Colgan
Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training courses. The
NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible to tailplane
stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121 aircraft.

The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:

13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
perform a tailplane stall recovery.

So for whatever reason, they don't share your view on the subject.

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm

On Feb 17, 5:02*pm, "Robert M. Gary" > wrote:
> As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
> reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
> same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
> for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
> forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
> stall scenario.
>
> -Robert

Now that's very interesting, I hadn't heard that before. If your
suspicion is true, it would be a much more reasonable explanation for
his behavior than gross incompetence.

John

FlyCherokee > wrote:

> On Feb 17, 5:02*pm, "Robert M. Gary" > wrote:
>>
>> As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
>> reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
>> same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
>> for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
>> forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
>> stall scenario.
>>
>> -Robert
>
> Now that's very interesting, I hadn't heard that before. If your
> suspicion is true, it would be a much more reasonable explanation for
> his behavior than gross incompetence.

The NTSB had a long enough list of things that were done wrong to seriously
question both pilots' competence. Just read the presentations on crew
response and pilot professionalism on the following NTSB web page:

http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2010/Clarence-Center-NY/presentations.htm

They are short slide presentations, but are full of things that simply
weren't done properly.

Robert M. Gary writes:

> As I was watching the special and they described how the captain
> reacted to the stall warning I couldn't help wonder if he attended the
> same tailplane icing course I did. His reaction was text book correct
> for a tailplane stall in icing conditions (pull back, not push
> forward). He may have believed his problem was ice, not an typical
> stall scenario.

The evidence for his overall incompetence was strong enough that it is
unlikely he'd have specific competence in dealing with tailplane icing. It's
more likely that he was responding instinctively--and incorrectly--to the
circumstances.

Tailplane icing was indeed considered as a possibility initially, before the
long list of errors made by the pilots became fully apparent.

FlyCherokee writes:

> Now that's very interesting, I hadn't heard that before. If your
> suspicion is true, it would be a much more reasonable explanation for
> his behavior than gross incompetence.

Why would it be more reasonable when the bulk of the evidence points to
incompetence?

"James Robinson" > wrote
>
> In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that Colgan
> Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training courses. The
> NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible to tailplane
> stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121 aircraft.
>
> The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:
>
> 13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
> perform a tailplane stall recovery.

I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the specific
type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying, from which he had only
recently changed to the type he was flying in the accident. The pilots were
not attentive to their airspeed in the final moments of the flight, which
probably was the largest contributor to the cause of the accident, as I
recall.
--
Jim in NC

"Morgans" > wrote:

>
> "James Robinson" > wrote
>>
>> In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that
>> Colgan Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training
>> courses. The NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible
>> to tailplane stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121
>> aircraft.
>>
>> The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:
>>
>> 13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
>> perform a tailplane stall recovery.
>
> I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
> tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the
> specific type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying, from which
> he had only recently changed to the type he was flying in the
> accident. The pilots were not attentive to their airspeed in the final
> moments of the flight, which probably was the largest contributor to
> the cause of the accident, as I recall.

Yes, there was much discussion on various forums and blogs about how the
captain had previously flown Saabs, which were subject to tailplane
stalls. The NTSB would have know that, so it is interesting that they
express such a strong conviction that he was not trying to recover from
such a stall. They must have their reasons, but I suppose we will have
to wait for their final report to see what they are.

(I didn't listen to the NTSB hearing, so I don't know if they expanded on
their reasoning during the discussions.)

"Morgans" > wrote in message
...
>
> "James Robinson" > wrote
>>
>> In the NTSB presentations at the public hearing, they noted that Colgan
>> Air presented a video on tailplane icing in their training courses. The
>> NTSB went on to note that the Dash 8 is not susceptible to tailplane
>> stalls in icing, nor are any other current Part 121 aircraft.
>>
>> The thirteenth conclusion in their summary was:
>>
>> 13 - It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to
>> perform a tailplane stall recovery.
>
> I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
> tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the specific
> type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying, from which he had only
> recently changed to the type he was flying in the accident. The pilots
> were not attentive to their airspeed in the final moments of the flight,
> which probably was the largest contributor to the cause of the accident,
> as I recall.
> --
> Jim in NC
>
My recollection is the same.

Actually, the appearance that they were "chasing the airspeed" suggests some
interesting possiblilities. My personal suspicion is that fatigue played a
major role in the poor airspeed control which fed the accident sequence; and
I have yet to decide whether (or how) that possibility might influence any
future flying decisions as an airline passenger.

Peter

Morgans writes:

> I seem to recall something about the captain responded to a suspected
> tailplane stall by taking the action that was appropriate to the specific
> type of aircraft he had _previously_ been flying ...

The action for a tailplane stall would have been the same. For a tailplane
stall, you pull back on the yoke.

Peter Dohm writes:

> Actually, the appearance that they were "chasing the airspeed" suggests some
> interesting possiblilities.

From the flight-data animation and transcript, it's obvious that they weren't
even paying attention to airspeed.